

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

China and the ABM

January 15, 1970

Questions for the Meeting of January 29-31, 1970

1. The agreed intelligence community judgment in SNIE 13-69 is that the possession of nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery is likely to have a sobering effect upon Chinese policy, and that China will probably be subjected to the same constraints and complications of policy as the other nuclear powers.

A. Do you agree? If you do not agree, could you explain why you disagree?

B. Can China be deterred from attacking the U. S. or its allies by the nuclear weapons which the U. S. now possesses or which it will need in the future to deter a Soviet attack?

C. How likely would be a Chinese first strike against the U. S. in the absence of an ABM defense?

2. SNIE 13-69 states that "for some time" China is likely to value its nuclear capability primarily as a great power status symbol and for its political effects.

A. This estimate implies that China is not building nuclear weapons systems with the intention of using them in a

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first strike. Do you agree?

B. Will China try to build a secure deterrent capability?

C. What are the "political effects" that SNIE 13-69 concludes China expects? Do they include blackmail of Asian neighbors, the U. S. or the USSR?

3. What strategic capabilities will China have by 1975? By 1980?

4. How would you expect Chinese strategic plans to be affected by a SALT agreement under which the U. S. and the USSR deploy anti-China ABM systems?

A. Would China assume that either the U.S. or the USSR was keeping a first strike capability that increased the danger to China's security?

B. How would you expect general Chinese policy toward the U.S. to be affected by a Soviet - U.S. agreement on anti-Chinese ABM systems?

5. What level of U.S. casualties could be expected from a Chinese first or second strike by 1975 (1980) assuming a full U. S. Safeguard deployment and the Chinese nuclear capability now projected by the intelligence community?

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A. How soon would Safeguard need to be expanded to keep U.S. fatalities from a Chinese first or second strike at this level?

B. What effect upon the U.S. and Soviet assured destruction capability vis-a-vis each other would such an increase in ABM defense against China have?

C. Should the U.S. seek to maintain a first strike capability against the Chinese? If so, for how long?

6. What options would the Chinese have for circumventing Safeguard (e.g. unorthodox means of delivery, CBW, attacks on Alaska, Hawaii, Tokyo)? Would these be attractive to them?

7. Does Soviet security from Chinese attack require an anti-China ABM system now or in the 1980's?

8. Would the ABM deployed by the USSR in the event of a SALT agreement permitting an anti-China ABM be such as to require the U.S. to deploy MIRV in order to maintain an assured destruction capability against the USSR?

9. How will Mao's death affect Chinese nuclear arms policy? What are the chances for a revival of the Chinese-Soviet alliance?

10. How would our Far Eastern allies, especially Japan, react to deployment of an anti-China ABM system by the U.S. and the USSR?

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## QUESTIONS CONCERNING CHINA AND THE ABM

1. The agreed NIE judgment (March 1969) is that the actual possession of nuclear weapons is likely to have a sobering effect on Chinese policy, and that China will probably be subjected to the same constraints and complications of policy as the other nuclear powers. Comment.
2. That same NIE states that "for some time" China is likely to value its nuclear capability primarily as a great-power status symbol and for its political effects. Comment. How long is "for some time?"
3. In what manner do US, Soviet, considerations dictate Chinese strategic weapons planning?
4. Over the next decade, what mix of regional and continental strategic weapons capabilities is Peking likely to develop?
5. How important a factor will US ABM progress be in China's policy consideration, over the next decade, as compared with developments re US strategic weapons? The same re ABM agreements reached by the US and the USSR?
6. How likely is Chinese nuclear blackmail -- vis-a-vis Asia, the US, the USSR -- and what forms, specifically, are any such efforts likely to take?
7. What kind of strategic weapons capability are the Chinese Communists likely to have by 1975? 1980?
8. What specific Chinese progress is likely in penetration aids by 1975? 1980?

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9. How important a US-Soviet problem will result if the US expands its ABM system to meet growing Chinese capabilities?

10. What steps are the Soviets taking re re-orienting their ABM's against the Chinese? Their strategic missiles? How firm are our data on these questions?

11. What will be the prospects for China's nuclear behavior in a post-Mao situation?

12. Prospects for the Sino-Soviet relationship in a post-Mao situation, and especially the possible effects upon US defenses against strategic attack?

13. How would Chinese conduct be affected in the event that the Japanese should begin to develop a nuclear capability?

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/I - 7E44		
2	<i>Memo. from [redacted] Smith</i>		
3	<i>ref</i> [redacted]		
4			
5	<i>Pls file ACDA</i>		
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
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CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b> ACDA/GAC Questions on China and the ABM -- for GAC Meetings 29-31 January 1970. Herewith a preview look at China-ABM questions which Mr. Dean Rusk, McCloy's China panelist, is asking DCI to give his views on. Rusk's letter to DCI should arrive today. Note that these China-ABM questions include a number of items on which CIA may not wish to comment. Note also that the attached list of questions considerably re-words the (13 January) China-ABM questions I suggested to ACDA/GAC (attached), in response to its request. <i>cc: Bruce Clarke, A. Smith, [redacted] Carl Duckett</i>			
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
[redacted]			19 Jan 70